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GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND THE 
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL 
COURT AS CRITICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
ALLY 
Carlo A. Pedrioli*
            “[I]t is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that 
marriage must remain a heterosexual institution because that is what it 
historically has been.”1 
  
 
 * Senior Lecturer in Public Law, Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool, England, U.K. J.D., 
University of the Pacific, Sacramento, CA, U.S.A., 2002; Ph.D., Communication, University of 
Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, U.S.A., 2005; Member, State Bar of California, U.S.A.  
  For detailed feedback from a rhetorical scholar on an earlier version of this Article, the 
author recognizes Kerith M. Woodyard. The author presented a prior version of the Article at the 
annual conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and Humanities, held at 
Georgetown University in Washington, DC, U.S.A., on March 6, 2015; the author also presented 
portions of a prior version of the Article at the annual meeting of the Association of Law, Property, 
and Society, held at the University of Georgia in Athens, GA, U.S.A., on May 2, 2015. © 2021 
Carlo A. Pedrioli. 
 1. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 n.23 (Mass. 2003). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, “the oldest appellate court in continuous existence in the 
Western Hemisphere,” charged with interpreting “the oldest, still 
functioning written constitution in the world,”2 announced its decision 
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.3 Goodridge was the 
first state supreme court opinion to strike down restrictions on same-
sex marriage in the United States.4 In asserting the right of sexual 
minorities to civil marriage, the Supreme Judicial Court gave the 
Massachusetts Legislature 180 days to bring the law into conformity 
with the Court’s reading of the Massachusetts Constitution.5 In 
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate,6 an advisory opinion issued to 
the Massachusetts Senate on February 3, 2004, the Court insisted that 
sexual minorities must have access to marriage; civil unions would not 
suffice.7 On May 17, 2004, Massachusetts became the first state in the 
United States to make marriage available for same-sex couples, and 
many such couples took advantage of the new opportunity.8 
The decision in Goodridge came in response to the modern social 
movement for same-sex marriage, which had begun in the 1990s with 
litigation that several same-sex couples had brought in Hawaii.9 
Shortly after the Hawaii litigation, organizations like Lambda Legal 
and the Equality Federation, a nationwide umbrella group of sexual 
 
 2. About the Supreme Judicial Court, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-
details/about-the-supreme-judicial-court (last visited Apr. 9, 2021). The Massachusetts 
Constitution dates back to 1780. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 988 n.7 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 3. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 4. Anthony Brooks, Mass. High Court Strikes Down Gay Marriage Ban: Judges Find Law 
Barring Same-Sex Unions Unconstitutional, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 18, 2003, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1511038. 
 5. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969–70. 
 6. 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
 7. Id. at 570. Commentary noted that such a dual system that allowed heterosexual couples 
to have access to marriage but restricted same-sex couples to civil unions not only privileged 
marriage, but the system also “reproduce[d] exclusions.” Jeffrey A. Bennett, Seriality and 
Multicultural Dissent in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 3 COMMC’N & CRITICAL/CULTURAL 
STUD. 141, 149 (2006). 
 8. State-Sanctioned Gay Marriages Begin in Massachusetts, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 17, 
2004, 11:17 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/law-jan-june04-gaymarriage_05-17; 
How It Happened: 10 Years of Gay Marriage, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 17, 2014, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/17/313457795/how-it-happened-10-years-of-gay-marriage. 
 9. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23, abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 
644 (2015). 
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minority rights groups, made same-sex marriage a priority.10 The 
Plaintiffs in Goodridge and their legal counsel were part of this 
movement. Preferring to promote other matters like anti-
discrimination law outside of the area of marriage, not all members of 
the larger social movement for sexual minority rights supported the 
push for same-sex marriage.11 One major concern was the potential 
for backlash,12 which had followed the litigation in Hawaii.13 
Goodridge was controversial, and the backlash was swift and 
intense. Emails to the Supreme Judicial Court, including those from 
other states, arrived, and many authors called the justices “every name 
imaginable.”14 A group hired planes to fly above the justices’ 
neighborhoods with banners critical of the members of the Court.15 
The justices received death threats, and, after giving a speech on King 
Day in 2004, one justice was picked up by an armed guard.16 
President George W. Bush and his advisors took advantage of the 
opportunity that Goodridge presented. In the 2004 State of the Union 
Address, delivered on January 20, only two months after the Court’s 
decision, Bush gave the following warning to a national audience: 
Activist judges . . . have begun redefining marriage by court 
order, without regard for the will of the people and their 
elected representatives. On an issue of such great 
consequence, the people’s voice must be heard. If judges 
insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only 
alternative left to the people would be the constitutional 
process. Our nation must defend the sanctity of marriage.17 
 
 10. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 176 (2013). 
 11. See id. at 176–77. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 417 (2d ed. 2008). 
 14. Roderick L. Ireland, In Goodridge’s Wake: Reflections on the Political, Public, and 
Personal Repercussions of the Massachusetts Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1417, 
1421 (2010). 
 15. Id. at 1421–22. 
 16. Id. at 1421, 1431. 
 17. George W. Bush, Third Presidential State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/stateoftheunion2004.htm. 
(9) 54.2_PEDRIOLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/21  9:51 AM 
2021] GOODRIDGE AND MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 519 
By the summer of 2004, the Bush reelection campaign anticipated that 
same-sex marriage might be the issue that would get Bush reelected 
that November.18 
At both the federal and state levels, constitutional amendments to 
ban same-sex marriage were in play. In 2004 and 2006, lawmakers in 
Congress, with the help of President Bush, attempted to pass a federal 
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage, but the measure 
failed to gain two-thirds majorities in both federal houses.19 In 2004, 
thirteen states amended their constitutions to ban same-sex marriage.20 
Before 2004, only three states had such bans.21 Between 2005 and 
2012, fifteen more states banned same-sex marriage.22 In 
Massachusetts, an attempt to overturn Goodridge via a state 
constitutional amendment moved forward in March 2004, although 
that particular attempt ultimately failed in September 2005.23 
Overstating the importance of Goodridge would be difficult. 
Although the Vermont Supreme Court had stated in 1999 that sexual 
minorities were entitled to the benefits of marriage, the Vermont 
Supreme Court had allowed the Vermont Legislature to give sexual 
minorities the right to civil unions instead of marriage.24 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court went beyond civil unions. In 
the years that followed Goodridge, other state supreme courts 
followed the position taken by the Supreme Judicial Court, and 
eventually legislatures and voters in numerous other states took action 
that led to the right to same-sex marriage.25 As difficult as it would 
 
 18. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 464 
(2005). 
 19. David Masci & Ira C. Lupu, Overview of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/07/overview-of-same-sex-
marriage-in-the-united-states/. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Rick Klein, Vote Ties Civil Unions to Gay-Marriage Ban: Romney to Seek Stay of SJC 
Order, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/articles
/2004/03/30/vote_ties_civil_unions_to_gay_marriage_ban/; Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects 
Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/
15/us/massachusetts-rejects-bill-to-eliminate-gay-marriage.html. 
 24. Masci & Lupu, supra note 19; see Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 25. See Erica Ryan, Timeline: Gay Marriage in Law, Pop Culture and the Courts, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (June 26, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/21/174732431/timeline-gay-
marriage-in-law-pop-culture-and-the-courts. 
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have been to predict only a few years after Goodridge,26 a decade after 
the decision, same-sex marriage was becoming much more available 
across the United States,27 and a dozen years after the decision, in 
Obergefell v. Hodges,28 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down, on 
federal constitutional grounds, several state statutes that prohibited 
same-sex marriage, which effectively legalized same-sex marriage 
across the United States.29 
Although courts do interface with social movements, courts do 
not often contribute to leading the way for change. For example, when 
the U.S. Supreme Court issued the Brown v. Board of Education30 
public school desegregation decision, some states already had begun 
to desegregate their schools, so the Supreme Court was following the 
legislatures, the representatives of the people, in those states.31 When, 
in United States v. Windsor,32 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
the heterosexual-only federal definition of marriage in the Defense of 
Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA),33 same-sex marriage was already 
legal in twelve states,34 and the national public opinion was slightly in 
favor of same-sex marriage.35 Again, the Supreme Court followed. 
To the contrary, in Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, not a legislative body representative of the public, 
played a leading role in mandating a change in the social order before 
the culture, or at least significant portions of it, would accept such 
 
 26. Peter Dickinson, Love Is a Battlefield: The Performance and Politics of Same-Sex 
Marriage in North America, 28 TEXT & PERFORMANCE Q. 277, 294 (2008). 
 27. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/. 
 28. 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 29. Id. at 675. 
 30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 31. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–45 (2004). The South refused to desegregate its 
schools for many years. A decade after Brown, in the eleven states in the old Confederacy, only 
1.17% of Black students attended school with White students. DERRICK BELL, SILENT 
COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL 
REFORM 96 (2004). 
 32. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 33. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United 
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down Section 3, which contained the heterosexual-
only federal definition of marriage) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (superseding 
Section 2, which allowed sibling states not to recognize same-sex marriages from other states). 
 34. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 765. 
 35. Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in U.S., GALLUP 
(May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-solidifies-above.aspx. 
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change.36 Prior to Goodridge, no state had legalized same-sex 
marriage, and, at the time of the decision, only 33% of people in the 
United States supported same-sex marriage, while 58% opposed it.37 
Although, according to one poll, 50% of Massachusetts residents 
supported same-sex marriage in the months prior to Goodridge, 44% 
of state residents opposed same-sex marriage at that time.38 Moreover, 
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and many members of the 
Massachusetts Legislature opposed same-sex marriage, and, in the 
wake of the decision, the Legislature was seriously contemplating 
avoiding same-sex marriage by offering civil unions for same-sex 
couples.39 Governor Romney supported a state constitutional 
amendment to ban same-sex marriage.40 Given these dynamics, 
Goodridge provides an intriguing set of texts for study. 
Without attempting to discount the role of activists who led the 
modern movement for same-sex marriage, this Article draws upon 
social movement theory in the field of communication to examine how 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court played a leading role from 
within the establishment in furthering the social movement for same-
sex marriage in the United States. The Article looks at the various 
opinions in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, as well as 
those in Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, the Court’s responses 
to the Massachusetts Senate’s request for an advisory opinion on 
providing civil unions but not marriage to sexual minorities, to see 
how the members of the Court, closely divided four votes to three in 
both sets of opinions, constructed or refrained from constructing 
marriage as a right that should be available to sexual minorities. The 
Article proceeds by offering a brief note on social movement theory 
in communication; examining the various opinions in Goodridge, 
including the controlling opinion, a concurring opinion, and three 
dissenting opinions; and reviewing the ensuing advisory opinions, 
including the majority opinion and the two dissenting opinions. This 
discussion should contribute toward a greater understanding of state 
 
 36. Klarman, supra note 18, at 477. 
 37. David Masci, High Court to Hear Same-Sex Marriage Cases, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/03/20/high-court-to-hear-same-sex-marriage-cases/. 
 38. Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, 50% in Poll Back SJC Ruling on Gay Marriage, BOS. GLOBE 
(Nov. 23, 2003), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/11/23/50_in_poll_back_sjc_rul
ing_on_gay_marriage/. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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supreme court rhetoric of social change and also offer some 
refinement of social movement theory, particularly regarding how a 
faction within a fractured establishment can further a social 
movement. 
II.  A BRIEF NOTE ON SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY IN 
COMMUNICATION 
In the field of communication, consideration of social movements 
became particularly intense during and shortly after the mid-1960s.41 
Between 1965 and 1980, communication scholars published over 200 
studies of various aspects of social movements.42 Such study is 
understandable given the great amount of social angst and the ensuing 
unrest that the 1960s produced. Of course, other fields such as political 
science and sociology have devoted great attention to social 
movements as well,43 but the focus here will be on social movement 
theory in communication. 
Social movements are “group action undertaken by social actors, 
including individuals, groups and organizations, for the purpose of 
affecting social and political change.”44 From the perspective of 
traditional social movement theory in communication, social 
movements have unfolded in a particular manner. Initially, 
individuals, who are generally relatively large in number,45 are 
concerned with some aspect of society and seek change.46 Different 
types of media are important in furthering the message of a social 
movement,47 and leadership provides the face of the movement that 
 
 41. See Stephen E. Lucas, Coming to Terms with Movement Studies, 31 CENT. STATES SPEECH 
J. 255, 255 (1980). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Christina R. Foust & Kate Drazner Hoyt, Social Movement 2.0: Integrating and Assessing 
Scholarship on Social Media and Movement, 18 REV. COMMC’N 37, 38 (2018). 
 44. Halim Rane & Sumra Salem, Social Media, Social Movements and the Diffusion of Ideas 
in the Arab Uprisings, 18 J. INT’L COMMC’N 97, 98 (2012). 
 45. Lucas, supra note 41, at 255. 
 46. Leland M. Griffin, The Rhetoric of Historical Movements, 38 Q.J. SPEECH 184, 184 
(1952). 
 47. Karma R. Chávez, Counter-Public Enclaves and Understanding the Function of Rhetoric 
in Social Movement Coalition-Building, 59 COMMC’N Q. 1, 6 (2011). Social movements can use 
media to convey logical and emotional discourses, verbal and nonverbal discourses, and some 
combination of these types of discourse. See KEVIN MICHAEL DELUCA, IMAGE POLITICS: THE 
NEW RHETORIC OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM 14–22 (1999). See generally Franklyn S. Haiman, 
Nonverbal Communication and the First Amendment: The Rhetoric of the Streets Revisited, 68 Q.J. 
SPEECH 371, 371 (1982) (discussing developments in nonverbal modes of protest). Although media 
concentration can be a challenge for a social movement that is trying to promote its message, more 
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the public recognizes.48 The social movement agitates against the 
establishment, generally making the movement’s presence known, 
and the establishment responds to movement activity, often in an 
attempt to control the social movement.49 Social movements can 
constitute both phenomena and meaning.50 
One important aspect of traditional social movement theory has 
been that social movements are not institutionalized.51 From this 
perspective, a social movement organization is not part of the 
establishment,52 and the organization often tries to form its identity in 
such a manner as to separate itself from the establishment.53 Indeed, 
the line between the social movement and the establishment is clear. 
Established institutions that change themselves do not constitute social 
movements, and when a social movement becomes part of the status 
quo, the social movement is no longer a social movement.54 
A classic example of a social movement is the civil rights 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s.55 At that time, many African-
Americans responded to racially discriminatory laws and practices, 
 
recent technologies can help a movement get around media concentration. See DELUCA, supra, at 
47. See generally Elise Danielle Thorburn, Social Media, Subjectivity, and Surveillance: Moving 
on from Occupy, the Rise of Live Streaming Video, 11 COMMC’N & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 
52, 52 (2014) (discussing the use of live streaming in the 2012 Quebec student strike). 
 48. CHARLES J. STEWART, CRAIG ALLEN SMITH & ROBERT E. DENTON, JR., PERSUASION 
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 111–12 (4th ed. 2001). Study of social movements has focused on public 
rhetorical actions such as the “oratorical, material, visual, or performative and embodied.” Chávez, 
supra note 47, at 2. 
 49. JOHN W. BOWERS, DONOVAN J. OCHS & RICHARD J. JENSEN, THE RHETORIC OF 
AGITATION AND CONTROL 4, 8 (2d ed. 1993); Erika Biddle, Re-Animating Joseph Beuys’ “Social 
Sculpture”: Artistic Interventions and the Occupy Movement, 11 COMMC’N & 
CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 25, 29–30 (2014). Although traditional thinking has been that physical 
presence is important in social movements, more recent thinking has considered the possibility that 
physical absence may be important in some social movements. See id. at 29–30 (considering the 
Occupy movement of fall 2011). 
 50. Lucas, supra note 41, at 258. For an argument that social movements constitute meaning 
as opposed to phenomena, see Michael Calvin McGee, “Social Movement”: Phenomenon or 
Meaning?, 31 CENT. STATES SPEECH J. 233, 233 (1980). McGee argued that, for the rhetorical 
study of movements to become its own domain, such study should be hermeneutic as opposed to 
simply behavioral in nature. Id. at 241–42. 
 51. Lucas, supra note 41, at 255–56; STEWART, SMITH & DENTON, supra note 48, at 5–6. 
 52. STEWART, SMITH & DENTON, supra note 48, at 5. 
 53. Jennifer Ann Peeples, Downwind: Articulation and Appropriation of Social Movement 
Discourse, 76 S. COMMC’N J. 248, 251 (2011). 
 54. STEWART, SMITH & DENTON, supra note 48, at 5–6. 
 55. See Franklyn S. Haiman, The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical 
Considerations, 53 Q.J. SPEECH 99, 99–100 (1967). 
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such as those related to public accommodations and voting.56 The civil 
rights movement found support in and inspiration from the Black 
church.57 Martin Luther King, Jr., himself a pastor, was a principal 
face of the movement.58 Leaders like King spoke out publicly, while 
they and their followers drew attention to their cause in the streets and 
elsewhere.59 These developments received much-needed media 
coverage, particularly on television.60 Meanwhile, Southern 
politicians tried, both rhetorically and physically, to resist the 
movement.61 
Other examples of social movements include the movements for 
women’s rights,62 against the Vietnam War,63 for Latino/a rights,64 
against neoliberalism,65 and to address the climate crisis.66 Some 
social movements have developed specific names. The Me Too, 
Occupy, and Black Lives Matter movements, which respectively have 
demanded change regarding sexual harassment and assault of 
women,67 socioeconomic inequality,68 and police violence against 
Black people,69 are three examples of such movements. Movements 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive of each other. 
The traditional perspective on social movements described above 
assumes a homogenous establishment that responds monolithically to 
the agitation of a movement. However, the establishment is not always 
 
 56. Id. at 99–100, 112; Jack Nelson, The Civil Rights Movement: A Press Perspective, 28 
HUM. RTS. 3, 4 (2001). 
 57. Dennis C. Dickerson, African American Religious Intellectuals and the Theological 
Foundations of the Civil Rights Movement, 1930–55, 74 CHURCH HIST. 217, 217–20 (2005). 
 58. Id. at 217. 
 59. Id.; Haiman, supra note 55, at 99–100, 112. 
 60. Nelson, supra note 56, at 4. 
 61. Dan T. Carter, Legacy of Rage: George Wallace and the Transformation of American 
Politics, 62 J. S. HIST. 3, 6–7 (1996); Nelson, supra note 56, at 4. 
 62. Chávez, supra note 47, at 2. 
 63. See Haiman, supra note 55, at 99. 
 64. See Fernando Pedro Delgado, Chicano Movement Rhetoric: An Ideographic 
Interpretation, 43 COMMC’N Q. 446, 446 (1995). 
 65. See Shiv Ganesh & Cynthia Stohl, Qualifying Engagement: A Study of Information and 
Communication Technology and the Global Social Justice Movement in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
77 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 51, 51–52 (2010). 
 66. Nicholas S. Paliewicz, Making Sense of the People’s Climate March: Towards an 
Aesthetic Approach to the Rhetoric of Social Protest, 83 W.J. COMMC’N 94, 94–95 (2019). 
 67. See Emma Frances Bloomfield, Rhetorical Constellations and the 
Inventional/Intersectional Possibilities of #MeToo, 43 J. COMMC’N INQUIRY 394, 400–01 (2019). 
 68. See Biddle, supra note 49, at 26–27. 
 69. See Chloe Banks, Disciplining Black Activism: Post-Racial Rhetoric, Public Memory and 
Decorum in News Media Framing of the Black Lives Matter Movement, 32 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA 
& CULTURAL STUD. 709, 710 (2018). 
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homogenous and actually may be fractured in responding to 
agitation.70 Indeed, engagement may take place within the 
establishment.71 After the movement’s initial agitation, engagement 
can occur between or among the factions within the power structure.72 
For instance, if a faction within the court system is receptive to a 
movement’s message, the court system can be a point of entry into the 
system for agitators.73 Presumably, if an internal faction is large or 
influential enough, the original agitators can do more than have their 
message heard, and significant social change is possible. 
When, via a faction within the establishment, a social movement 
gains significant access to a limited part, but not all parts, of the 
establishment, the line between the social movement and the 
establishment becomes blurred. While the social movement may still 
exist outside the establishment, and factions of the establishment may 
attempt to control the social movement in response to the movement’s 
agitation, a portion of the establishment nonetheless labors on behalf 
of the social movement. That pro-social movement faction of the 
establishment is neither the social movement itself nor the 
establishment that attempts to control the social movement. Thus, the 
pro-social movement faction of the establishment functions in a 
liminal rhetorical space that is theoretically provocative and 
suggestive of a need for some revision of traditional social movement 
theory in communication. This complicating dynamic of a strong pro-
social movement faction of the establishment developed in the 
Goodridge case, and the consequences were profound. 
III.  THE GOODRIDGE OPINIONS AS RESPONSES TO AGITATION 
AGAINST A FRACTURED ESTABLISHMENT 
Although litigation over same-sex marriage in the United States 
dates back to the 1970s,74 same-sex couples who sought access to 
 
 70. Carlo A. Pedrioli, A Fractured Establishment’s Responses to Social Movement Agitation: 
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Negotiation of an Outsider Point of Entry in Walker v. City of 
Birmingham, 44 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 107, 108 (2010). 
 71. Id. at 115. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 116. 
 74. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 18–19; see, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 
1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 
644 (2015). 
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marriage were never taken seriously in court until the 1990s.75 During 
the 1990s, in response to lawsuits that various same-sex couples 
brought, the supreme courts in both Hawaii and Vermont considered 
the possibility of same-sex marriage. The Hawaii Supreme Court 
indicated that the government needed to satisfy strict scrutiny, the 
highest level of judicial review, to limit marriage to only different-sex 
couples, but the public approved a constitutional amendment to allow 
the Hawaii Legislature to limit marriage to only different-sex couples 
without government satisfaction of the strict scrutiny test.76 The 
Vermont Supreme Court struck down the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the benefits of marriage but allowed the Vermont 
Legislature to provide for civil unions with those benefits, which it did 
shortly thereafter.77 
The Plaintiffs who brought the Goodridge case were the next in a 
line of litigants to agitate a state supreme court for the right to marry 
civilly and thus to become part of the larger movement for sexual 
minority rights. These Plaintiffs were Julie Goodridge, David Wilson, 
Robert Compton, Michael Horgan, Edward Balmelli, Maureen 
Brodoff, Ellen Wade, Gary Chalmers, Richard Linnell, Heidi Norton, 
Gina Smith, Gloria Bailey, and Linda Davies.78 Mary L. Bonauto, 
counsel for the Plaintiffs, indicated, “At its core, Goodridge [was] a 
case about real people and real families who asked their government 
to treat them equally and fairly.”79 
In Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was 
fractured in responding to the Plaintiffs’ agitation. Four of the seven 
justices were receptive to the Plaintiffs’ arguments for same-sex 
marriage, while three justices were not receptive to those arguments. 
Thus, engagement occurred among members of the Court, and the 
fracturing on the Court provided the point of entry for the outsiders. 
Not only did a point of entry develop, but, in a wide-open case 
with little precedent, the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court, 
although not the social movement itself, played a role in furthering the 
 
 75. JASON PIERCESON, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE ROAD TO THE 
SUPREME COURT 87 (2013). 
 76. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 56, 65–66; see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) 
(plurality opinion), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23, abrogated 
by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 77. KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 76–79; see Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 78. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d. 941, 949 (Mass. 2003). 
 79. Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005). 
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social movement for same-sex marriage. By virtue of the power of 
judicial review, via which judges can review acts of other branches of 
government,80 the majority functioned as an agent of change on behalf 
of the social movement. Although partially institutionalized, the social 
movement for same-sex marriage had not become fully 
institutionalized because, in addition to the dissenting members of the 
Court, the Governor and many members of the Legislature did not 
agree with the decision of the majority of the Court.81 Also, most 
people in the country did not support same-sex marriage.82 President 
Bush even criticized Goodridge in the State of the Union Address two 
months after the decision.83 Thus, the matter was not the case of an 
institution that decided to reform itself, nor was it the case of a social 
movement that had become the norm. Rather, the movement for same-
sex marriage had gained an important ally in the majority of the Court 
for an ongoing struggle, and the struggle would continue in part 
because of the strong negative responses from other components of 
the establishment, including other branches, or parts of them, of the 
Massachusetts government and two branches of the federal 
government. Presumably, many of the elected officials were 
responding in a manner expressive of their constituents’ views. 
To examine how the justices on a fractured Court rhetorically 
engaged each other and how the majority supported the movement for 
same-sex marriage, this section of the Article looks at the controlling 
opinion by Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, which Justices Roderick 
Ireland and Judith Cowin joined, the concurring opinion by Justice 
John Greaney, and the dissenting opinions by Justices Francis Spina, 
Martha Sosman, and Robert Cordy. Justice Marshall’s opinion only 
 
 80. WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 1 (2000). Judicial review dates back to 1610 in England, when Edward Coke crafted his 
opinion in Bonham’s Case. Id. at 34–35. Although judicial review did not become established in 
England at that time, it did eventually make its way to the Colonies. Id. at 35–36. In the future 
United States, judicial review dates back to 1761, when Massachusetts attorney James Otis argued 
for the principle in Paxton v. Gray. Id. During the 1780s and 1790s, state courts began to accept 
the concept of judicial review. Id. at 36–37. After having assumed, but not having decided, in two 
1790s cases that it had the power of judicial review, the U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through the 
voice of Chief Justice John Marshall, officially accepted judicial review in 1803. Id. at 37; Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). For better or worse, judicial review became a permanent part of the 
constitutional landscape in the United States. Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy, 
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 593 (2003). 
 81. Phillips & Klein, supra note 38. 
 82. Masci, supra note 37. 
 83. See Bush, supra note 17. 
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had three votes, but Justice Greaney indicated in his concurrence that 
he “agree[d] with the result reached by the court, the remedy ordered, 
and much of the reasoning in the court’s opinion,”84 so the result that 
Marshall’s opinion announced carried the day in setting precedent in 
Massachusetts that became available to supreme courts in states across 
the United States. At the heart of the conflict between the majority and 
the dissenters were the nature of the right at stake and the role, if any, 
that the Court should play in guaranteeing that right. 
A.  Chief Justice Margaret Marshall’s Controlling Opinion 
As the ensuing discussion will show, Chief Justice Marshall 
focused her groundbreaking opinion on discrimination against sexual 
minorities and the Court’s power of judicial review to vindicate 
minority rights in constitutional cases. She refused to accept 
arguments that might have justified limiting the right to marriage for 
sexual minorities. Of note, she also attempted to humanize the 
Plaintiffs. 
Marshall was an immigrant to the United States from South 
Africa.85 During a high school study abroad experience in 
Wilmington, Delaware, she received encouragement to think for 
herself, which could have led to trouble in apartheid-era South 
Africa.86 When she later returned to the States for graduate school, she 
became involved in opposing the Vietnam War and promoting the 
women’s movement.87 Nonetheless, she had a traditional career for a 
Yale law graduate, which included the private practice of law, general 
counsel work for Harvard, and membership on the bench.88 Thus, one 
might see Marshall as “a combination of the ultimate establishment 
figure and the ultimate anti-establishment figure.”89 
In her Goodridge opinion, Marshall stated the key question in the 
case as “whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the 
Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and obligations 
 
 84. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., 
concurring). 
 85. Nina Totenberg, Former Mass. Chief Justice on Life, Liberty, and Gay Marriage, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (June 7, 2013, 3:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/06/07/189288605/former-mass-
chief-justice-on-life-liberty-and-gay-marriage. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who 
wish to marry.”90 In answering in the negative, she noted that the 
Massachusetts Constitution disallowed “the creation of second-class 
citizens.”91 
The chief justice endeavored to frame the terms of the discussion 
in a focused manner. She recognized that many different individuals 
held “religious, moral, and ethical convictions” against and in favor of 
same sex marriage.92 Nonetheless, she indicated, perhaps not entirely 
honestly, that the Supreme Judicial Court had to base its decision on 
the Massachusetts Constitution rather than on personal views.93 In 
making this pitch for judicial credibility, she suggested that personal 
views somehow did not inform a justice’s reading of the relevant but 
vague provisions of the Constitution. For this general principle by 
which judges supposedly avoid bringing their views to decision-
making, she cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas,94 which earlier that year had struck down a Texas 
anti-sodomy law aimed only at sexual minorities.95 
Likely to address negative stereotypes of sexual minorities, 
Marshall made an effort to present the fourteen Plaintiffs in the most 
favorable light possible. She noted that, at the time the case had been 
filed, the individuals in the seven couples had been in committed 
romantic relationships for thirty, twenty, thirteen, thirteen, eleven, 
seven, and four years.96 The Plaintiffs were also professional people 
in business, law, banking, education, therapy, and engineering, and the 
Plaintiffs were active in their communities.97 
The specific statute in question was Massachusetts General Law 
Chapter 207, which Marshall construed to restrict civil marriage to 
different-sex couples.98 She admitted that, traditionally in the 
Commonwealth, different-sex coupling had been the understanding of 
civil marriage.99 Nonetheless, the relevant constitutional question 
called for consideration of the equal protection and due process 
 
 90. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 95. Id. at 578. 
 96. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 952–53. 
 99. Id. 
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provisions in the Commonwealth’s Constitution, which frequently 
overlapped.100 
Marshall considered the nature of civil marriage, a “wholly 
secular institution” that the government created.101 In effect, marriage 
involved the Commonwealth and two spouses.102 The institution came 
with many benefits, including joint income filing for state taxes, 
tenancy by the entirety, extension of the homestead exemption to 
one’s spouse and children, inheritance rights in the absence of a 
spousal will, and numerous other benefits that Marshall listed.103 
Calling upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving v. 
Virginia,104 which had protected the right to marry under both the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,105 Marshall described marriage 
as “a ‘civil right.’”106 
The chief justice looked at the history of discrimination in 
marriage laws, noting that racial discrimination had been a major 
ingredient in laws that had restricted marriage.107 She observed that 
both the U.S. Supreme Court in Loving and the California Supreme 
Court nearly twenty years earlier in Perez v. Sharp108 had struck down 
anti-miscegenation laws.109 Analogizing sexual orientation to race, 
she stated, “[H]istory must yield to a more fully developed 
understanding of the invidious quality of the discrimination.”110 The 
majoritarian impulse was not enough to prevent the judiciary from 
protecting minority rights.111 
Because the reasons that the Department of Public Health and 
various amici curiae offered would fail rational basis review,112 the 
most deferential of all standards of judicial review of government 
 
 100. Id. at 953. 
 101. Id. at 954. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 955–57. 
 104. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 105. Id. at 11–12. 
 106. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957. 
 107. Id. at 958. 
 108. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (also known as Perez v. Lippold). 
 109. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 958 n.16. 
 112. As Justice Cordy noted, Marshall reversed the burden of proof in a case in which she 
claimed the standard of review was rational basis. Id. at 998 n.21 (Cordy, J., dissenting). In such a 
case, the burden of proof is on the challenger, not the government. Id. 
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action, Marshall would not subject those reasons to strict scrutiny, the 
most exacting standard of judicial review.113 Even under the 
deferential standard of rational basis, state due process or equal 
protection rights were violated.114 
The chief justice responded to the various arguments in favor of 
the law one at a time. First, Marshall disagreed that the main purpose 
of marriage was procreation.115 Although she admitted that many, if 
not most, couples had children, she pointed out that fertility was not 
required for marriage.116 Rather, marriage was defined by an 
“exclusive and permanent commitment.”117 
Second, Marshall disagreed that heterosexual marriage provided 
the optimal setting for having children.118 She observed that the family 
in the United States had been changing and was continuing to 
change.119 Marshall pointed out that the Department of Public Health 
admitted that individuals in same-sex couples could be “‘excellent’ 
parents.”120 Unfortunately for individuals in same-sex couples, child-
rearing was made more difficult by exclusion of sexual minorities 
from the rights associated with marriage.121 
Third, Marshall rejected the assertion that denial of marriage to 
same-sex couples would conserve public or private money.122 She said 
that the Department of Public Health should not assume that 
individuals in same-sex relationships were any more independent from 
each other, and thus less in need of marital benefits like tax advantages 
and health care, than individuals in different-sex relationships were.123 
Additionally, beyond the reasons that the Department of Public 
Health proffered, Marshall examined various reasons for the law that 
amici curiae advanced, and she rejected all of them.124 Although 
admitting that change may have been in the air in light of the Court’s 
eventual vote, she denied that granting the right to same-sex marriage 
 
 113. Id. at 961 (controlling opinion). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 962. 
 119. Id. at 962–63. 
 120. Id. at 963. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 964. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 964–67. 
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would destroy civil marriage.125 Calling upon race as an analogy, she 
stated that the Plaintiffs were not attempting to do away with marriage 
for heterosexual individuals any more than individuals who sought 
interracial marriage had been trying to prohibit individuals of the same 
race from marrying each other.126 
Focusing specifically on judicial review in constitutional cases, 
Marshall disagreed that the Massachusetts Legislature should decide 
the issue.127 “We owe great deference to the Legislature to decide 
social and policy issues,” she noted, “but it is the traditional and settled 
role of courts to decide constitutional issues.”128 Marshall indicated 
that, in constitutional cases, the courts should promote “the extension 
of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or 
excluded.”129 
Finally, Marshall rejected two other amici arguments.130 In terms 
of the interstate conflict that could result because of the legalization of 
same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, the chief justice said that such 
consideration should not prevent the Court “from according 
Massachusetts residents the full measure of protection available under 
the Massachusetts Constitution.”131 In terms of a supposed community 
consensus against intimate same-sex conduct, Marshall pointed to 
various Commonwealth laws against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, including those in the areas of employment, housing, 
public accommodation, public education, and others.132 
In short, Marshall concluded that the Department of Public Health 
and amici curiae had failed to present a rational basis for the denial of 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.133 “The marriage ban,” she 
commented, “works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real 
segment of the community for no rational reason.”134 Marshall 
recognized that “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, 
 
 125. Id. at 965. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 965–66. 
 128. Id. at 966. 
 129. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (addressing discrimination 
against women at the Virginia Military Institute, a public institution of higher education that 
admitted only men)). 
 130. Id. at 967. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 968. 
 134. Id. 
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but [that] the law [could] not, directly or indirectly, give them 
effect.”135 
Having found no reason to deny the Plaintiffs relief, Marshall 
turned to the matter of remedy. She noted that the Supreme Judicial 
Court faced a similar problem as the Court of Appeal for Ontario had 
earlier that year in Halpern v. Attorney General of Canada,136 when 
the latter court had reviewed a same-sex marriage ban in light of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.137 Like the members of the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario, Marshall opted to modify the common-
law definition of marriage to include same-sex couples.138 The revised 
definition of civil marriage in Massachusetts would be “the voluntary 
union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”139 The 
case would be remanded to the lower court for entry of judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiffs, but entry would be stayed for 180 days so that 
the Massachusetts Legislature could “take such action as it may deem 
appropriate in light of this opinion.”140 
B.  Justice John Greaney’s Concurrence 
As noted above, Justice Greaney “agree[d] with the result reached 
by the court, the remedy ordered, and much of the reasoning in the 
court’s opinion.”141 However, as the following discussion will show, 
he sought to place more attention on the equal protection analysis. 
What he saw as sex-based discrimination called for careful judicial 
review. Additionally, he responded to arguments based on tradition, 
and he rejected original intent as a means of constitutional 
interpretation. Finally, Greaney made an emotional plea for 
acceptance of the sexual minorities who sought civil marriage. 
Article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, modified by 
Article 106 of the Amendments to the Commonwealth’s Constitution, 
protected against discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion, or 
 
 135. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
 136. (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 137. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. For discussions of the history of same-sex marriage in 
Canada, see, for example, Christy M. Glass & Nancy Kubasek, The Evolution of Same-Sex 
Marriage in Canada: Lessons the U.S. Can Learn from Their Northern Neighbor Regarding Same-
Sex Marriage Rights, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 143, 160–73 (2008); R. Douglas Elliott, The 
Canadian Earthquake: Same-Sex Marriage in Canada, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 591, 609–19 (2004). 
 138. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 969–70. 
 141. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
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national origin.142 According to Greaney, this was “a straightforward 
case of discrimination that disqualifie[d] an entire group of our 
citizens and their families from participation in an institution of 
paramount legal and social importance.”143 
Greaney described civil marriage not as a privilege conferred by 
the state, but as a fundamental right.144 To support this proposition, he 
cited several U.S. Supreme Court cases, including Loving, the decision 
that had struck down anti-miscegenation statutes.145 
The concurring justice considered the classification as one based 
on the sex of the two individuals who sought to marry.146 For example, 
Hillary Goodridge could not marry Julie Goodridge because the 
former was a woman.147 In the same way, Gary Chalmers could not 
marry Richard Linnell because the former was a man.148 For authority, 
Greaney cited opinions from the justices on the Hawaii Supreme Court 
and the Vermont Supreme Court, both of which had considered same-
sex marriage in the 1990s.149 Greaney expressed concern with the 
view that a sexual minority was not denied the right to marriage 
because the individual could find a different-sex partner.150 
Greaney’s analysis regarding sex-based discrimination was 
slightly different from that of Justice Denise Johnson in Baker v. 
State,151 a similar case that the Vermont Supreme Court had decided 
in 1999 without requiring same-sex marriage.152 In her opinion, 
Justice Johnson had noted that a woman could not marry another 
woman because the prospective marital partner was a woman.153 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Greaney treated the words sex and gender as synonyms. Id. at 970–71. From an academic 
perspective, this is inaccurate. Although the terms overlap, sex is a biologically-based designation, 
and gender is a social construction and expression. JULIA T. WOOD, GENDERED LIVES: 
COMMUNICATION, GENDER, AND CULTURE 20–21 (9th ed. 2011). For a discussion of sex and 
gender, see id. at 20–27. 
 147. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23, abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 
644 (2015); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 897 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 152. See generally id. at 867. 
 153. Id. at 905 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Likewise, a man could not marry another man because the prospective 
martial partner was a man.154 As Johnson had seen it, since the law did 
not inquire into sexual practices or identities, the discrimination was 
based on sex, not sexual orientation.155 Still, the two justices agreed 
that sex-based discrimination was at play in their respective cases. 
Seeing an infringement of a fundamental right and a sex-based 
classification, Greaney applied strict scrutiny, the highest level of 
judicial review of the government action.156 Thus, the government had 
to show “a compelling purpose furthered by the statutes that [could] 
be accomplished in no other reasonable manner.”157 
Greaney noted that couples had a right to have children, 
regardless of sexual orientation or marital status.158 Since the 
Commonwealth’s policy of denying marriage to same-sex couples 
impacted the legal protections and benefits of children of same-sex 
couples, Greaney saw a “caste-like system” that was “irreconcilable 
with, indeed, totally repugnant to, the State’s strong interest in the 
welfare of all children.”159 
The concurring justice addressed the arguments based on 
tradition. He responded to such arguments by noting the following: 
To define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of 
those to whom it always has been accessible, in order to 
justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been 
accessible, is conclusory and bypasses the core question we 
are asked to decide. This case calls for a higher level of legal 
analysis. Precisely, the case requires that we confront 
ingrained assumptions with respect to historically accepted 
roles of men and women within the institution of 
marriage . . . .160 
Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 
Greaney stated that the current case was about constitutional law, not 
tradition.161 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 972–73. 
 161. Id. at 973. 
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On a related note, Greaney considered the original intent behind 
revising Article I. He recognized that such an intent had not been to 
promote same-sex marriage.162 Regardless, Greaney specifically said 
that he did not accept the philosophy of the original intent school of 
constitutional interpretation.163 The views of one time, the concurring 
justice believed, should not be allowed to discriminate against 
individuals who live in another time, and equal protection principles 
should control.164 
Greaney concluded his opinion with an emotional plea that those 
who opposed same-sex marriage would come to accept the Court’s 
decision.165 “The plaintiffs,” he noted, “volunteer in our schools, 
worship beside us in our religious houses, and have children who play 
with our children . . . .” 166 He added, “We share a common humanity 
and participate together in the social contract that is the foundation of 
our Commonwealth. Simple principles of decency dictate that we 
extend to the plaintiffs, and to their new status, full acceptance, 
tolerance, and respect.”167 
C.  Justice Francis Spina’s Dissent 
Consideration of the three dissenting opinions in Goodridge 
makes apparent the Court’s fracturing in response to the Plaintiffs’ 
agitation. As the ensuing discussion will show, in his dissent, Justice 
Spina saw the case as one in which the Court had usurped the power 
of the Legislature. He believed that the Legislature had the power to 
regulate marriage, while the Court was supposed to protect, not create, 
individual rights. Social change should come from the Legislature, not 
the judiciary. 
Spina considered both equal protection and due process grounds 
for the lawsuit. He did not see a case for equal protection, either based 
on sex or sexual orientation.168 In terms of sex-based 
discrimination,169 he did not see that the government was treating 
 
 162. Id. at 974 n.6. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 973. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 974–75 (Spina, J., dissenting). 
 169. Like Greaney, Spina used the words sex and gender as synonyms. Id. 
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either sex differently.170 Indeed, “both men and women [were] 
similarly limited to marrying a person of the opposite sex.”171 In terms 
of sexual orientation, he did not see any discrimination either.172 Spina 
said, “All individuals, with certain exceptions not relevant here, are 
free to marry. Whether an individual chooses not to marry because of 
sexual orientation or any other reason should be of no concern to the 
court.”173 Apparently, it was not necessary to consider if a sexual 
minority would wish to marry someone of the other sex. 
The dissenting justice addressed the Loving decision that 
Marshall and Greaney used in their opinions. Spina indicated that, in 
Loving, the U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed the matter of 
marrying a person of the same sex.174 Moreover, the government in 
the present case had not intended to discriminate based on sexual 
orientation, as the Commonwealth of Virginia had intended to 
discriminate based on race in Loving.175 
As with equal protection, Spina did not see a case for due 
process.176 From Spina’s perspective, everyone, regardless of sexual 
orientation, was free to enter a civil marriage with someone of the 
other sex.177 Again, it was apparently not necessary to consider if a 
sexual minority would wish to do so. 
To develop the due process analysis, Spina considered the nature 
of the right to determine what level of judicial review should be 
applied to the government action.178 If a fundamental right were 
involved, then strict scrutiny should apply.179 If no fundamental right 
were involved, then rational basis would apply.180 To determine if the 
right to same-sex marriage were fundamental, Spina called upon 
tradition, asking whether that right was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history.”181 Clearly, the answer was that such a right was not.182 In the 
Commonwealth itself, the Legislature, when addressing the problem 
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of workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation, had indicated 
that the Legislature had no intent to validate same-sex marriage.183 
Spina believed that, in granting same-sex marriage to sexual 
minorities, the Court was exceeding its power.184 He asserted, “Such 
a dramatic change in social institutions must remain at the behest of 
the people through the democratic process.”185 The dissenting justice 
spoke of “judicial restraint” and “separation of powers.”186 For an 
example of what the Court should have done, he referenced a then-
recent case in which the Court had refused to extend health insurance 
to domestic partners because the matter was one of policy.187 The 
creation of new rights was for the people via the Legislature.188 
D.  Justice Martha Sosman’s Dissent 
Like the dissent of Justice Spina, the dissent of Justice Sosman 
helped to facilitate the Court’s fracturing in response to the agitation 
of the Plaintiffs. As the following discussion will show, Sosman 
focused on deference to the Legislature in the area of civil marriage. 
Still, despite her deferential legal stance, Sosman expressed her 
personal empathies toward sexual minorities who sought access to 
civil marriage. 
Sosman clarified that, when the Court applied rational basis 
review, which she believed appropriate,189 to the applicable statute, 
“the issue [was] not whether the Legislature’s rationale behind that 
scheme [was] persuasive to [the Court], but only whether it satisfie[d] 
a minimal threshold of rationality.”190 That some parents were raising 
children outside the parameters of traditional civil marriage, which 
those parents were free to do, did not mean that the Legislature had to 
provide full marital benefits to all households.191 
The dissenting justice suggested that she was not personally 
opposed to the idea that same-sex couples were raising children.192 
Sosman said that, for children, “a nurturing, stable, safe, consistent, 
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and supportive environment in which to mature” mattered more than 
“the gender, or sexual orientation, or even the number of the adults 
who raise them.”193 She expressed understanding that the four justices 
who constituted the majority vote saw “the traditional definition of 
marriage as an unnecessary anachronism, rooted in historical 
prejudices that modern society has in large measure rejected and 
biological limitations that modern science has overcome.”194 
Claiming to put aside a personal assessment, a credibility move 
similar to that of Chief Justice Marshall,  Sosman turned to scientific 
studies on the impact of raising children in same-sex couple 
households.195 She indicated that the studies were relatively new and 
not conclusive.196 Moreover, the studies were controversial.197 She 
noted, “This is hardly the first time in history that the ostensible steel 
of the scientific method has melted and buckled under the intense heat 
of political and religious passions.”198 The Legislature, which had 
created civil marriage, was entitled to review the evidence before 
making a change to the institution of marriage.199 
Sosman believed that Marshall’s opinion went beyond applying 
rational basis review to the statute and applied “some undefined 
stricter standard.”200 She colorfully commented the following: 
[W]hile claiming to apply a mere rational basis test, the 
court's opinion works up an enormous head of steam by 
repeated invocations of avenues by which to subject the 
statute to strict scrutiny, apparently hoping that that head of 
steam will generate momentum sufficient to propel the 
opinion across the yawning chasm of the very deferential 
rational basis test.201 
The dissenting justice tried to divorce the rational and emotional 
aspects of persuasion. She suggested that the four justices in the 
majority had let their emotions get the better of them because of the 
subject matter of the case.202 She drew an analogy between, on one 
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hand, same-sex marriage and, on the other hand, subsidies and tax 
credits for use of energy-efficient heating, both of which she believed 
should be reviewed under the rational basis standard.203 If the 
government provided financial incentives for using established 
heating methods as opposed to novel heating methods, according to 
Sosman, the four justices in the majority would not have seen a 
violation of the rational basis review standard.204 Sosman claimed that 
the justices in the majority should have been functioning logically 
instead of emotionally.205 
As such, the Legislature should have had the opportunity to 
decide the matter.206 Particularly, the Legislature should have been 
able to determine whether a risk existed of “damaging the institution 
of marriage or adversely affecting the critical role it has played in our 
society.”207 Then the Legislature could decide if “a fundamental 
alteration” to civil marriage were appropriate.208 
In the conclusion to her opinion, Sosman made several important 
additional concessions. She acknowledged that the Court’s decision 
might “represent a great turning point that many w[ould] hail as a 
tremendous step toward a more just society.”209 She added that there 
was “much to be said for the argument that excluding gay and lesbian 
couples from the benefits of civil marriage [was] cruelly unfair and 
hopelessly outdated.”210 She also admitted that she and her fellow 
dissenting justices were close to sexual minorities who were “friends, 
neighbors, family members, classmates, and co-workers.”211 
E.  Justice Robert Cordy’s Dissent 
Justice Cordy’s dissent, the third and final dissent in the case, 
further facilitated the Court’s fracturing in response to the agitation of 
the Plaintiffs. As the ensuing discussion will show, Cordy felt that the 
Court should have deferred to the Legislature because of the lesser 
nature of the right at stake. He acknowledged that it may have been 
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beneficial to allow sexual minorities to marry, but he did not want the 
Court to make that change. 
Cordy determined that no fundamental right was at issue.212 
According to common law tradition, marriage was an institution that 
the Commonwealth had created.213 Although marriage in general was 
a fundamental right, there was not necessarily a right to marry 
someone of the same sex.214 The contexts for famous U.S. Supreme 
Court cases cited for this proposition, including Skinner v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Williamson,215 Griswold v. Connecticut,216 and Loving, were 
heterosexual in nature.217 Cordy noted that U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that spoke of marriage as a fundamental right had linked 
marriage with procreation.218 
To support his conclusion that no fundamental right was at issue, 
Cordy focused heavily on tradition. Calling upon U.S. Supreme Court 
case law, he noted that fundamental rights often were “so deeply 
rooted in our history and traditions.”219 Although marriage was so 
rooted in history and tradition, same-sex marriage was not.220 
In light of this analysis, Cordy pondered whether the Supreme 
Judicial Court should recognize a new right of marriage for same-sex 
couples. Expressing concern over allowing judges to have their policy 
preferences, the dissenting justice cautioned against the judiciary’s 
recognizing new rights.221 Again, he went back to tradition, noting that 
both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court had 
limited their recognition of new rights.222 
Cordy looked at recent legislation on same-sex marriage to 
determine whether “contemporary values ha[d] embraced the concept 
of same-sex marriage.”223 He admitted that marriage in general was in 
a state of flux, but he did not see an indication that the public supported 
same-sex marriage.224 He noted that, as of the early 2000s, no state 
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legislature had enacted a law that allowed same-sex marriage.225 
However, thirty-six states had enacted statutes to prohibit recognizing 
same-sex marriage, as had Congress through the Defense of Marriage 
Act.226 These legislative pronouncements, presumably the will of the 
people in the respective jurisdictions, did not support same-sex 
marriage.227 
In addition to arguing that a fundamental right was not at issue, 
Cordy argued that, under the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the 
Commonwealth’s Constitution, no suspect classification was at 
issue.228 Because there was no purpose to treat or effect of treating 
men or women differently, Cordy maintained that no sex-based 
discrimination was at work.229 
To bolster this conclusion, Cordy looked back at the history of the 
Commonwealth’s ERA. He noted that the commission that had studied 
the ERA in the 1970s had indicated that the then-proposed amendment 
would “have no effect upon the allowance or denial of homosexual 
marriages.”230 As indicated in the Boston Globe during the 1970s, the 
public debate that surrounded the passage of the ERA had reflected 
the view of the commission.231 As such, Cordy cautioned the Court 
against “completely disregarding what appear[ed] to be the clear intent 
of the people recently recorded in our constitutional history.”232 
Not finding a fundamental right to same-sex marriage or a suspect 
classification, Cordy endeavored to review the marriage statute for 
rationality.233 He noted that a heavy burden was on the Plaintiffs.234 
Under a rational basis review, the judiciary generally had to defer to 
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the public’s will carried out through the Legislature.235 This point was 
a matter of separation of powers within the state government.236 
In terms of the nature of the classification, Cordy claimed that the 
classification was based on the type of couple, whether same-sex or 
different-sex, and not on sex or sexual orientation.237 To him, that the 
type of couple was a function of the sexual orientations of the two 
adults who constituted the couple apparently did not matter. 
Cordy looked at the purposes of the marriage statute.238 Civil 
marriage, he noted, had been “the institutional mechanism by which 
societies ha[d] sanctioned and recognized particular family structures, 
and the institution of marriage ha[d] existed as one of the fundamental 
organizing principles of human society.”239 Cordy again emphasized 
that procreation had been a key component of civil marriage.240 He 
referenced Inhabitants of Milford v. Inhabitants of Worcester,241 a 
case that the Court had decided almost two hundred years earlier, for 
the idea that “civil marriage [had been] ‘intended to regulate, chasten, 
and refine, the intercourse between the sexes; and to multiply, 
preserve, and improve the species.’”242 Society without marriage 
“would be chaotic,” Cordy claimed.243 Despite recent changes 
regarding marriage, the institution still provided for “an optimal social 
structure within which to bear and raise children.”244 
The Court, along with other courts, had recognized both 
“marriage as an organizing principle of society” and the state’s interest 
in regulating marriage.245 Cordy cited various opinions that ranged 
from the Court’s Milford v. Worcester decision to U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions from the 1870s and 1880s.246 In one such case from the 
1870s, Reynolds v. United States,247 the U.S. Supreme Court had 
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decided that Congress could regulate plural marriage in the Utah 
Territory, regardless of the First Amendment free exercise of religion 
defense that had been raised.248 
Cordy looked for a connection between the state’s restriction of 
marriage as only different-sex in nature and the state’s interest in 
“supporting an optimal social structure for the bearing and raising of 
children.”249 Again, he stated that the Court should defer to the 
Legislature.250 Cordy noted that, in adopting the rational basis 
standard of review in her opinion, Marshall had misallocated the 
burden of proof by placing it on the Department of Public Health.251 
The dissenting justice pointed out that various empirical studies 
of children raised by couples of different sexual orientations were not 
conclusive regarding the impact on children of different-sex versus 
same-sex parenting.252 Also, the research methodologies of the studies 
had received criticism, and political preferences had impacted the 
studies.253 Thus, he indicated that, at least for the present, the 
Legislature could conclude that civil marriage should remain a 
different-sex institution.254 
On a related note, Cordy claimed that, even though the 
Commonwealth allowed same-sex couples to adopt children, such a 
policy should not require that the Commonwealth allow same-sex 
couples to marry.255 Allowing different types of families to adopt did 
not necessarily mean that the Commonwealth had to “view them all as 
equally optimal and equally deserving of State endorsement and 
support.”256 
Furthermore, Cordy speculated that the Legislature could have 
concluded that allowing same-sex couples to marry might “impair the 
State’s interest in promoting and supporting heterosexual marriage as 
the social institution that it has determined best normalizes, stabilizes, 
and links the acts of procreation and child rearing.”257 With the current 
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policy, the Legislature communicated the following “consistent 
message” to the members of the Commonwealth public: 
[T]hat marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of their 
procreative endeavor; that if they are to procreate, then 
society has endorsed the institution of marriage as the 
environment for it and for the subsequent rearing of their 
children; and that benefits are available explicitly to create a 
supportive and conducive atmosphere for those purposes.258 
Once again, Cordy insisted that “[p]rocreation ha[d] always been at 
the root of marriage,” and he took Marshall to task for disconnecting 
marriage and procreation.259 Marshall, he wrote, had “turn[ed] history 
on its head.”260 
Given the above, Cordy urged gradualism. For example, even 
though the Commonwealth had promoted a policy against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, Massachusetts should 
have time to experiment with the idea of same-sex marriage.261 A rush 
to change would allow “those who argue[d] ‘slippery slope’ [to] have 
more ammunition than ever to resist any effort at progressive change 
or social experimentation.”262 
Despite his stance against judicial recognition of same-sex 
marriage, Cordy concluded with several concessions to sexual 
minorities. He admitted, “There is no question that many same-sex 
couples are capable of being good parents, and should be (and are) 
permitted to be so.”263 He added, “The advancement of the rights, 
privileges, and protections afforded to homosexual members of our 
community in the last three decades has been significant, and there is 
no reason to believe that that evolution will not continue.”264 
IV.  THE ADVISORY OPINIONS AS JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO A 
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT AT CONTROL 
Not only was the Supreme Judicial Court, the leading institution 
in the judicial branch of state government, fractured in responding to 
the Plaintiffs’ agitation, but the overall government of the 
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Commonwealth was likewise fractured. While the majority of the 
Court supported same-sex marriage, Governor Romney supported a 
state constitutional ban on same-sex marriage,265 and the Legislature, 
itself divided, would soon meet in a state constitutional convention to 
debate such an amendment,266 which it also had done in 2002, 
although then without a vote.267 The Governor was very much against 
same-sex marriage.268 
Romney’s wish for a constitutional amendment looked as though 
it might be granted, but an amendment ultimately failed to clear all of 
the required hurdles to changing the Constitution. In March 2004, the 
Legislature, sitting in a constitutional convention, passed a 
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage but to allow civil 
unions for same-sex couples.269 However, the proposed amendment 
needed to pass again during the next legislative session and then be 
submitted to the people for approval.270 In September 2005, the 
amendment was defeated with both houses of the Legislature gathered 
for another constitutional convention.271 A later attempt by the 
Legislature to pass a constitutional amendment, which had originated 
as an initiative petition instead of within the Legislature, eventually 
failed, but only after the amendment passed the first time.272 
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In the immediate wake of the Goodridge decision, and prior to the 
Legislature’s passing a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex 
marriage, the Massachusetts Senate responded to the fractured 
Supreme Judicial Court’s responses to the Plaintiffs’ agitation. The 
Senate asked the Court for an advisory opinion regarding whether a 
bill that offered same-sex couples civil unions, but not marriages, 
would be constitutional.273 According to the proposed bill, Senate No. 
2175, a civil union would be the legal equivalent of a marriage, 
although the title would be different.274 Senate No. 2175 was a way of 
avoiding allowing sexual minorities to marry civilly. 
Again, the Court was divided four justices to three, and again the 
majority of the Court supported full marriage rights for sexual 
minorities. To examine how the justices on a fractured Court 
rhetorically engaged each other in responding to the Senate and how 
the majority supported the movement for same-sex marriage, this 
section of the Article examines Chief Justice Marshall’s majority 
opinion for herself and Justices Greaney, Ireland, and Cowin, as well 
as the dissent of Justice Sosman that Justice Spina joined and the brief 
dissent of Justice Cordy. Once again, the conflict between the majority 
and the dissenters involved assumptions about the role of the Court 
compared with that of the Legislature. 
A.  Chief Justice Margaret Marshall’s Majority Opinion 
In her advisory opinion, which had echoes of her opinion in 
Goodridge, Chief Justice Marshall read Senate No. 2175 as a violation 
of the equal protection and due process mandates of the Massachusetts 
Constitution.275 She took issue with the government’s “stated purpose 
to ‘preserv[e] the traditional, historic nature and meaning of the 
institution of civil marriage.’”276 Marshall cited Goodridge for the idea 
that the government’s aim should be “to encourage stable adult 
relationships for the good of the individual and of the community, 
especially its children.”277 
Marshall contended that tradition and majority sentiment were 
not controlling when state action constituted discrimination.278 While 
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individuals were free to have their perspectives on same-sex marriage, 
the government should not discriminate in light of constitutional 
rights.279 Any action to prohibit same-sex couples from being able to 
marry would be unconstitutional.280 
Furthermore, the chief justice described the proposed bill as an 
attempt at “[s]egregating same-sex unions from opposite-sex 
unions.”281 She commented, “The history of our nation has 
demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.”282 Marshall 
looked at the different labels used for same-sex and different-sex 
couples, noting that the distinction between terms created “second-
class status” for sexual minorities.283 The problem was not the word 
union but the distinction drawn between the words marriage and 
union,284 and “no amount of tinkering with language” would solve the 
problem.285 
Additionally, the Court should not interpret the Massachusetts 
Constitution based on whether rights recognized within Massachusetts 
would be recognized elsewhere.286 The author of the majority opinion 
acknowledged that federal law at that time did not recognize same-sex 
marriages and indeed allowed states to decline to recognize same-sex 
marriages obtained in other states.287 Marshall was referring to the 
Defense of Marriage Act,288 whose provision that restricted the federal 
definition of marriage to heterosexual marriage the U.S. Supreme 
Court ultimately struck down in United States v. Windsor.289 
Nonetheless, the Court had to interpret the Massachusetts 
Constitution, subject only to the federal minimum determined by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.290 
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B.  Justice Martha Sosman’s Dissent 
In her advisory opinion dissent, which Justice Spina joined, and 
which had echoes of her dissent in Goodridge, Justice Sosman 
revealed the continuing fractured nature of the Court on the matter of 
same-sex marriage. She determined that Senate No. 2175 would be 
constitutional. 
Sosman described the situation before the Court as “a pitched 
battle over who gets to use the ‘m’ word.”291 She noted that “[t]he 
insignificance of according a different name to the same thing ha[d] 
long been recognized.”292 To support this principle, she quoted from 
Juliet Capulet in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet as follows: 
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet; 
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d 
Retain that dear perfection which he owes 
Without that title.”293 
The dissenting justice distinguished the current matter over the 
word marriage from the matter in Goodridge, in which “none of the 
benefits, rights, or privileges” of civil marriage had been available to 
sexual minorities.294 By comparison, the current matter, an argument 
over labels, was “insignificant.”295 Indeed, Sosman thought that the 
term civil union was “perfectly dignified” and “connote[d] no 
disrespect.”296 
Sosman believed that the deferential rational basis standard of 
judicial review applied.297 Because, at that time, other governments in 
the country did not recognize same-sex marriage, the Legislature had 
a reason for using another term for same-sex unions.298 In terms of 
federal law, same-sex couples would not receive recognition for tax, 
social security, immigration, or other purposes.299 In terms of state 
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law, other states simply would not recognize same-sex marriages.300 
The “difference in terminology reflect[ed] the reality that, for many 
purposes, same-sex couples w[ould] have ‘a different status.’”301 
Sosman noted that, as of 2004, “no one predict[ed], even under the 
most optimistic scenario, that . . . widespread recognition [of marriage 
rights for same-sex couples would] be achieved anytime in the near 
future.”302 The dissenting justice did acknowledge that some people 
would find such different treatment unfair.303 
The dissenting justice argued that, even in Massachusetts, the 
Legislature might require time to review provisions of the law that 
touched on marriage and thus might have need for a different 
nomenclature, at least in the short term.304 For instance, Massachusetts 
law contained a presumption of paternity, which assumed that a child 
born to a married woman was the child of the woman’s husband.305 
This presumption would not make sense in a same-sex marriage 
context because the presumption was “a physical and biological 
impossibility.”306 
Additionally, Sosman took the Court, which she described as 
“activist . . . in support of th[e] cause” for same-sex marriage, to task 
for its analysis.307 She claimed that the Court had turned sexual 
orientation into a suspect class.308 Despite the result that it offered, 
Goodridge had not recognized sexual orientation as a protected class, 
nor had the case declared that same-sex marriage was a fundamental 
right.309 With its current advisory opinion, the Court had “discard[ed] 
the fig leaf of the rational basis test” and had “rel[ied] exclusively on 
the rhetoric rather than the purported reasoning of Goodridge.”310 
Sosman did not clarify how rhetoric and reasoning were mutually 
exclusive. Perhaps she was referring to Sophistic rhetoric rather than 
 
 300. Id. at 575. 
 301. Id. at 576. 
 302. Id. at 576 n.2. 
 303. Id. at 575. 
 304. Id. at 577. 
 305. Id. at 577 n.3. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 574. 
 308. Id. at 579. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
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rhetoric in general.311 Regardless, if the Court wanted to use the more 
exacting strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court should say so.312 
C.  Justice Robert Cordy’s Dissent 
In his brief dissent, Justice Cordy contributed to the Court’s 
fracturing. Cordy pointed out that the Senate bill provided “an 
identical bundle of legal rights and benefits” to same-sex and 
different-sex couples.313 Only the name of the legal institution 
varied.314 Accordingly, the bill might “not even raise a due process or 
equal protection claim.”315 
Nonetheless, if it were necessary to determine whether different 
labels required a law to satisfy the rational basis standard, Cordy 
preferred to withhold judgment until the conclusion of the 
Legislature’s deliberations.316 Because of the Goodridge opinion, the 
Court likely would have plenty of documentation to review regarding 
the Legislature’s purposes for passing Senate No. 2175.317 At that later 
time, he felt an appropriate determination could be made.318 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Informed by social movement theory in the field of 
communication, this Article has examined the rhetorics of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health, as well as in Opinions of the Justices to the Senate. The 
Article has shown how the Supreme Judicial Court fractured in 
responding to both the Plaintiffs’ movement activity in support of 
same-sex marriage and also to the legislative attempt at control after 
the original agitation and the Court’s ensuing Goodridge decision. 
Taken together, the opinions of Justices Marshall and Greaney focused 
on discrimination against sexual minorities and the Court’s power of 
 
 311. See Robert Hariman, Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory, 72 Q.J. SPEECH 38, 39 
(1986); GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR 
TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 66 (2d ed. 1999). For a general definition of 
rhetoric, see ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991). 
 312. Ops. of the Justs. to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 580 (Sosman, J., dissenting). 
 313. Id. at 580–81 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 314. Id. at 581. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. Cordy commented that the holding of Goodridge “rested on [a] slender reed.” Id. at 
580. 
 318. Id. at 581. 
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judicial review to vindicate minority rights in constitutional cases. The 
justices who constituted the majority bloc on the Court rejected 
tradition as a justification for oppression of minority rights. Also, the 
justices attempted to humanize the agitating sexual minority Plaintiffs 
and employed emotion as well as reason to do so. 
In contrast, taken together, the opinions of Justices Spina, 
Sosman, and Cordy focused on allowing the Legislature, in theory the 
representative of the people, to decide what the dissenting justices 
believed to be a public policy matter. The Legislature had, or, upon 
further debate, might have had, a rational basis for its action or 
potential action. The dissenting justices did not believe the Court 
should have decided such a matter. Justice Greaney later called the 
dispute about which branch of government should have decided the 
case “the seismic fault in state constitutional law decisions.”319 
Despite their position, the dissenters did express some empathy for the 
Plaintiffs. 
Furthermore, the Article has shown how, in a wide-open case 
with limited precedent, the majority of the Court, although not the 
social movement itself, played a leading role from within the 
establishment in furthering the movement for same-sex marriage. 
Using the tool of judicial review, the majority acted as an agent of 
change on behalf of the social movement. While partially 
institutionalized, the social movement for same-sex marriage had not 
become fully institutionalized. Indeed, other actors in the state 
government such as Governor Romney and portions of the 
Legislature, along with most members of the national public and some 
very powerful politicians in Washington, DC, including President 
Bush, did not support same-sex marriage. Through the Plaintiffs, the 
movement for same-sex marriage had gained an important ally in the 
Court for an ongoing struggle, and the struggle would continue, in part 
because of the strong negative responses from other components of 
the establishment. 
In so viewing Goodridge and the Opinions of the Justices, the 
Article has problematized traditional social movement theory in 
communication in several ways. Following less traditional research on 
social movements, the Article has provided an example of how 
 
 319. John M. Greaney, Breaking Down Barriers: The Goodridge Decision and Modern Civil 
Rights, 72 ALB. L. REV. 609, 614 (2009). 
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outsiders can have a point of entry into the system when the 
establishment, hardly monolithic, fractures in responding to agitation. 
Moreover, the Article has taken the additional step of illustrating what 
can ensue when outsiders have a point of entry. Indeed, a social 
movement can gain allies important enough in number or influence 
who can bring about change within the system. The majority of the 
Court, by virtue of judicial review, proved to be an influential ally 
within the establishment that could allow the movement meaningful 
access to the establishment. Neither the social movement itself nor a 
reactionary part of the establishment, the majority of the Court 
functioned in a liminal rhetorical space. Hence, the once-clear line 
between a social movement and the establishment can become, at least 
in some circumstances, less of a line and more of a blur. 
Although not the beginning of a social movement, Goodridge was 
the beginning of same-sex marriage recognized at the state supreme 
court level in the United States. In subsequent years, supreme courts 
in states like California,320 Connecticut,321 and Iowa322 would legalize 
same-sex marriage, and other components of the establishment would 


















 320. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 321. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 322. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
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